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Abstract / Résumé
Information Systems (IS) researchers often rely on
organizational economics models to describe and explain various IS
management issues. While those models are found to be useful, measures
are yet to be proposed to assess the dimensions of IS transactions. In this
paper, we present the results of a study that was a first effort toward this
end. The focus of the study was on one type of transaction, IS
operations, in a particular management context, that of outsouring.
Measures were developed for four critical dimensions of IS operation
transactions: asset specificity, measurement problem, origin of the most
important investment, and governance mechanism. Data from 250 large
Canadian firms were used to assess the measures, using the Partial Least
Squares (PLS) technique.
Léconomie des organisations est souvent mise à contribution
par les chercheurs en systèmes dinformation (SI). Peu de travaux ont
cependant proposé des instruments de mesure des dimensions
transactionnelles des opérations de SI. Ce mémoire marque un pas dans
cette direction. Nous proposons des instruments de mesure utiles à
lanalyse de limpartition des opérations informatiques. Quatre dimensions
importantes des transactions informatiques retiennent notre attention : la
spécificité des actifs, les problèmes de mesure, lorigine des
investissements les plus importants et le mode de régie des transactions.
Une analyse de moindres carrés partiels (Partial Least Squares) est
effectuée à laide de données provenant de 250 grandes entreprises
canadiennes.
21. Introduction
For the past decade, organizational economics has been an important reference
discipline for IS research. Beath (1983), for instance, used the notion of transaction
costs to explain the choice of a system development strategy, and for understanding
the role of users in an IS project (Beath, 1987). She proposed a model suggesting that
market governance is applicable in simple cases and that a bureaucratic governance
mode is more appropriate in complex situations. Malone, Yates, and Benjamin (1987)
studied the impact of information technologies on the choice between the firm and the
market. They found that information technologies reduce communication costs and
encourage the migration of economic activities from the firm to the market. Beath and
Straub (1989) used an agency model to explain why some information services are
managed by their users, some are handled by the different functions of the firm, while
others are centralized in an independent department. Gurbaxani and Kemerer (1989)
studied agency relationships between IS departments, other departments, and the
firms top management. They emphasized the discrepancies between the respective
goals of the parties, the problems of information asymmetry, and the measurement
problems inherent to software development. Gurbaxani and Whang (1991) integrated
agency theory and transaction costs theory in order to evaluate the impact of
information technologies on two attributes of a firm: size and allocation of decision
rights. They suggest that vertical integration reduces transaction costs, while
increasing agency costs. On the other hand, while horizontal integration increases
agency costs, it also generates economies of scale. Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) used
the transaction cost framework, along with a political perspective, to understand
outsourcing decisions. They found that outsourcing decisions were, to a certain extent,
based on cost considerations, and that managers were concerned with the threat of
opportunism when evaluating a proposition from a supplier.
These various applications of organizational economics demonstrate the explanatory
power of the theory. Interestingly, however, none of the above mentioned research
efforts was survey-based. This is rather surprising considering that surveys are the
most frequently used research design among IS researchers (Orlikowski and Baroudi,
1991). This may be explained by the absence of valid measures to assess the
dimensions of IS activities (or transactions). In view of the importance of high quality
measures (Zmud and Boynton, 1991) and of the role of construct and measure
development in the maturing of a knowledge area (Newsted, Munro, and Huff, 1991),
in this paper, we report on the development and validation of measures of the
dimensions of one type of IS transaction, that is, IS operations. We first present a brief
overview of the Organizational Economics framework, then describe the development
of the measures, and the assessment of their validity, using Partial Least Squares
analysis (PLS).
A quasi-rent is the difference between the value of an asset in its best use and the value it takes in its second1
best use (Pisano 1990, p. 159).
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2. Organizational Economics
As early as 1937, Coase recognized the failure of the price system, stating that the
more complex a transaction, the more costly it is to negotiate, write, and enforce the
contract between the parties involved. The costs of negotiating, writing, and enforcing
contracts are defined as transaction costs. When these reach a certain level, the
transaction is not profitable to the parties. Consequently, one of them may decide to
internalize the transaction in what is known as a firm; it will then incur management
costs, such as recruiting, supervision, and coordination costs. The market and the firm
are then alternative governance mechanisms to manage transactions, each being more
appropriate to a given situation. According to transaction costs theory, the decision
to use the market or the firm to regulate a transaction depends primarily on four
dimensions (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Williamson, 1985): (1) specificity of the
assets required to produce the goods; (2) uncertainty and measurement problems
surrounding the transaction; (3) origin of the most important investment; and, (4)
frequency of the transaction.
2.1 Asset Specificity
Williamson (1985) defines a specific asset as an asset which cannot be redeployed
without sacrificing its productive value if the contract is to be interrupted or
prematurely terminated. Because the next best use value of the asset is much lower,
the investor would loose part of its investment if the transaction was not completed.
This creates a lock-in situation where the other party (not investing) could extract a
quasi-rent from the investor by threatening to withdraw from the transaction (Riordan1
and Williamson, 1985). There are three types of specific assets: human assets, which
represent the learning and the knowledge parties need to acquire in order to participate
in the exchange, physical assets, that consist of the apparatus required for the
transaction completion, and site specificity, which is the need for a party to be
physically located near the other party to participate in the transaction.
Researchers have measured asset specificity in a variety of industries and contexts
such as: oil (Canes, 1976), railroad equipment (Palay, 1981), automobile industry
(Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Masten, Meehan, and Snyder, 1989), coal (Joskow,
1987, 1990), client loyalty (Anderson, 1988), offsetting investments (Heide and John,
1988), aluminum and tin (Hennart, 1988), and chemical products (Lieberman, 1991).
Another measure related to asset specificity is Miller and Dröges (1986) structural
liaison devices.
42.2 Uncertainty and Measurement Problems
A strong assumption of classical economic theory is the availability of information and
the ability of the parties to measure the value of the elements exchanged. This
assumption often proves false. Transactions are conducted with a certain level of
uncertainty and subject to measurement problems. Uncertainty can be defined as a
lack of information. Many aspects of a transaction carry an element of uncertainty.
For example it may be difficult to predict the future needs of the users in a software
development project. Measurement problems are the difficulties encountered in the
evaluation of an element of the exchange. For instance it may be difficult to evaluate
precisely the quality of the product exchanged. Ouchi (1980) and Barney and Ouchi
(1983, 1986) studied the possible coordination mechanisms when uncertainty and
measurement problems were present. One way to facilitate the exchange is to base the
compensation on a set of rules on which the parties agree ex ante. In this case, the
parties do not agree in advance on the products to be exchanged, but on the behavior
to adopt in different situations. This coordination mode is labelled bureaucratic
coordination (Ouchi, 1980; Barney and Ouchi, 1983, 1986). It is no longer a market
transaction, but a hierarchical one. Going a step further than Williamson (1981, 1985,
1989), these authors state that the hierarchical organization can also fail if transactions
are so complex that it becomes impossible to establish rules of actions. In order to
support the exchange in such circumstances, the parties need devices to alleviate
opportunism. They need to trust each other, and to be convinced that spot inequities
will even out in the long run since contributions cannot be measured. This is called
the clan mechanism, and presumes a commitment from all parties (Barney and Ouchi,
1983).
Numerous studies have measured uncertainty and measurement problems is various
contexts such as the automobile industry (Walker and Weber, 1984) or across
industries (Jones, 1987; Caves and Bradburd, 1988). Other studies, mainly in
Organization Theory, have measured various aspects of uncertainty and measurement
problems, even if they did not use the transaction cost framework (Inkson, Pugh, and
Hickson, 1970; Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980; Miller and Dröge, 1986; Barki, Rivard,
and Talbot 1993).
2.3 Origin of the Most Important Investment
When two parties enter into a contract, each one may have to make specific
investments. These investments are often of different value and the investment from
one party may be significantly more important for the success of the transaction than
that of the other party. The origin of the most important investment is the identity of
5Figure 1 A Model of IS Operation Outsourcing
6the party making the investment that is the most critical to the success of the
transaction. Grossman and Hart (1986) discussed the effects of the allocation of
control over a decision on the incentives parties have to invest in transaction specific
assets. When it is impossible to specify ex ante all the contingencies needed to write
a complete contract, it may be efficient to relinquish decision rights to a third party.
The third party must be impartial and be recognized as such. In very complex
situations, it will be difficult for the third party to know and process all the information
related to the transaction and control over decisions can be allocated to one of the two
contracting parties (Tirole, 1988). This allocation of control is not without side
effects. Grossman and Hart (1986) indicated that there were inefficiencies associated
with non-optimal investment levels made by contracting parties. Depending on the
allocation of control, the parties will modify their investment level. Under-investment
occurs when both parties decide independently on their actions. If the decision rights
are allocated to one of the two parties, the one holding control rights will be induced
to over-invest while the other will under-invest. Grossman and Hart (1986) also note
that, in the best interest of the two parties, the party making the most important
investment for the final output should receive the decision rights in order to move as
close as possible to the optimal decision. The literature has not proposed any formal
measure to evaluate the origin of the most important investment.
2.4 Frequency
Frequency is another key dimension of a transaction. Organizing a transaction within
the firm implies creating a governance structure. This generates important and
irreversible costs. If a transaction is known to be unique, these costs will very likely
be too important to allow for the integration of the exchange within the firm. The firm
will prefer to bear the cost of the risk associated with specific investments or
uncertainty rather than invest in order to internalize a single transaction. Internal
organization is only efficient for recurrent transactions.
3. A Model of IS Operation Outsourcing
As applied to outsourcing of IS operations, the transaction costs model remains with
three critical dimensions having an impact on the choice of a governance mechanism
for a given transaction (see Figure 1). Since frequency of IS operations can be
regarded as infinite, because operations are performed on a continuous basis, this
dimension is therefore not a factor in the decision to outsource. When applied to the
IS outsourcing, the model then suggests the following relationships. When asset
specificity is low, when there is no problem of measure, and when the most important
investment comes from the supplier, outsourcing should be the chosen governance
7mode. An increase in asset specificity should bring a move of the governance mode
toward the firm. Increased measurement problems should induce utilization of clan
mechanisms and a move toward the firm. For the origin of the most important
investment, following the Grossman and Hart argument, a transaction with an
important investment coming from the firm should induce the firm to keep it under its
control and conversely, a transaction with an important investment coming from an
external party should induce the firm to outsource this transaction.
4. Development of the Measures
The measures presented in this paper were developed and validated in the particular
context of IS operation outsourcing. Measures using the transaction costs approach,
whether in economics, Marketing, or other fields, along with measures from
Organization Theory, were reviewed in order to identify those that could be adapted
to the context of IS operations. Data gathered during a study of IS outsourcing in ten
large organizations (Aubert, Rivard, and Patry, 1993) served as another input for
constructing the measures. It provided detailed descriptions of outsourcing
arrangements and the corresponding activities. In order to clarify the discussion, the
dimensions of the transaction cost analysis (asset specificity, uncertainty and
measurement problems, origin of the most important investment, as well as the
governance mode selected for a transaction) will be referred to as constructs. These
constructs are reflected by several narrower elements called variables. Each of these
variables is measured by several items (Figure 2).
4.1 Asset Specificity
In this section, we present the origin of the elements composing the asset specificity
construct. No existing measure assessing this construct for IS operations was found.
All but one variable corresponding to the construct were built for this study. From the
description of the ten organizations presented in Aubert, Rivard, and Patry (1993), and
from a review of practitioner literature, a list of investments that could be needed to
complete an outsourcing transaction was established. These investments reflected the
first two variables: clients investments (three items) and suppliers investments (nine
items). The third variable is human asset specificity. If the conduct of specific IS
operations imposes distinctive actions, it should be directly related to specific skills,
therefore to human asset specificity. Employees should hence show distinctive
abilities, specifically learned to operate in this environment. The human resources
specificity was measured by seven items evaluating this learning. The fourth variable
was the human resources replacement delay. Specific human assets should be more
difficult to replace than non-specific human assets. Ten items evaluated this variable.
8The other variable included in the asset specificity construct was the structural liaison
devices measure proposed by Miller and Dröge (1986). It was adapted to the IS
operation outsourcing context. Finally, a measure evaluating, for each IS activity
presented in Appendix 1, if the activity was unique to the firm, to a few firms, to an
industry, or common to several industries was included. Highly specific activities
should be unique to a firm or, at least, to an industry.
4.2 Uncertainty and Measurement Problems
Several measures developed in Organization Theory assess uncertainty and
measurement problems. The measures developed by Van de Ven and Ferry (1980)
(job standardization, six items, and task difficulty, four items), Miller and Dröge
(1986) (formalization, seven items), and Barki, Rivard, and Talbot (1993) (task
complexity, twenty items) were included in the uncertainty and measurement problems
construct. They were adapted and reformulated to conform with the outsourcing
context.
The evidence gathered by Aubert, Rivard, and Patry (1993) indicated that the
organizations described in the study were using several formal measures to control
their information services, regardless of whether these services were provided by an
outsourcer or by an in-house IS department. These formal measures (presented in
Appendix 2) composed the last variable of the uncertainty and measurement problem
construct.
4.3 Origin of the Most Important Investment
Since the literature does not suggest measures to evaluate the origin of the most
important investment, one was built for the purposes of this study. For each of the IS
operations presented in Appendix 1, a question measured the relative importance of
technical skills when conducting the operation, and another measured the importance
of business skills when conducting the same operation. Business skills should be
more developed in the firms working in their line of business and technical skills
should be more widespread among the outsourcers (because IS are their line of
business). These questions established the relative importance of business and
technical skills for each activity, and therefore reflected the origin of the most
important investment (coming from the business side or from the technical side).
4.4 Governance Mode
The governance mode evaluates the governance structure chosen for each IS
operation. A fundamental dimension of the governance mode is whether the activity
9is performed in-house or outsourced. If there is an outsourcing arrangement, the
governance mode encompasses the governance features established in the contract to
ensure a smooth relationship between the client and the outsourcer. Different
situations are possible, representing different levels of outsourcing.
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Figure 2 IS Operation Outsourcing Model with items
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A company can perform all of its operations in-house using its own employees. It can
also perform operations in-house using employees from an external supplier. A
further step toward total outsourcing is when a firms equipment is hosted at a site
owned and operated by its supplier. Finally, total outsourcing is encountered if all
operations are performed by the supplier on its equipment and at its own location. A
list of IS operations was built. For each operation, the various governance modes
were presented to identify the one employed (see Appendix 1).
Clan mechanism features included in the contract, assessed by a list of questions
inquiring about such possible features, were included in the instrument. The list came
from a the descriptions of outsourcing arrangements provided by Aubert, Rivard, and
Patry (1993) and from a literature review.
4.5 Refinement Procedures
Two refinement steps were undertaken: a classification exercise performed by judges
(Moore and Benbasat, 1991), and a pre-test of the instrument with practitioners.
Following the procedure proposed by Moore and Benbasats (1991), every item of the
various measures was printed on a card, and the cards randomly numbered. A
complete set of cards was submitted to each of seven judges who were either IS faculty
or graduate students, along with a list of the constructs that were to be measured.
Judges were asked to sort the cards according to the different constructs. The sorted
cards were coded and compared to the expected correct classification. Perfect
agreement with the correct classification was not expected, since we the judges were
asked to note very subtle differences among variables. For example, the items of the
formalization variable are very close to many items from the task complexity variable.
Nevertheless, high agreement was expected for the main constructs: specificity,
measurement problems, origin of the investment, and governance mode.
In order to evaluate the concordance between the judges and our intended
classification, we used the Kappa coefficient (Cohen 1960). This coefficient, which
varies from -1 to 1, evaluates the level of agreement between two judges; it represents
the proportion of joint judgments in which there is agreement, after random agreement
is excluded (Cohen 1960).
When considering the first classification, with all the detailed variables, the Kappa
coefficients computed for the classifications of the different judges (compared to the
questionnaire) ranged from 0.55 to 0.72 with an average of 0.64 (standard deviation:
0.05). Moore and Benbasat (1991) indicated that scores between 0.5 and 0.6 were
satisfactory for exploratory work. Since our measures were either new or had been
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adapted from existing instruments, and had not been empirically tested, the Kappa
coefficients were found to be adequate. When we grouped the different sub-classes
into their larger corresponding constructs, the scores ranged from 0.68 to 0.89. The
average score was 0.80, with a standard deviation of 0.07. This means that the items
assigned to one of the larger constructs were different from the ones assigned to other
constructs, hence that they were assessing different dimensions of transactions. This
result provides some support for the convergent and discriminant validity of the
measures.
In order to make sure that the items were clearly worded and would be easily
understood by the target audience of IS managers, the list of items was submitted to
two IS executives from two different organizations. These two assessors suggested
the elimination of two items because IS executives would probably not have the
information available. These items pertained to the operations of the outsourcer and
that information is usually kept confidential. The items came from the task difficulty
measure (Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980) and referred to problems encountered by the
outsourcer. The outsourcer will put in tremendous efforts to avoid letting its client
know it is encountering problems in the conduct of IS operations.
4.6 Survey procedures
Further to the first refinement procedure, a survey was conducted in order to pursue
the validation of the instrument. From information published by Canadian Business
(1992) and CanCorp - Financial Post (1993), a database with the names and
addresses of large firms was developed, identifying who was responsible for the IS
operations in each of them. The firms came from all industrial sectors. Their average
assets were over $1.4 billion and they had an average of 1,680 employees.
Subsequently, IS executives from 1,780 firms were contacted by phone and asked to
participate in the study. The questionnaire was sent to the 1,410 executives who
agreed to participate. Of these, 630 questionnaires (44%) were returned. This
response rate is similar to that obtained in other studies using similar survey
procedures (Chan, 1992).
5. Reliability and Validity Assessment
Partial Least Squares (PLS), a second generation multivariate method, was used to
assess the reliability and the validity of the measures. The method employed and the
results obtained from the analysis are presented in this section.
The items forming the various constructs were all reflective. Formative indicators imply that the items2
form, cause, or precede the construct. In this situation the construct is a summative index. Reflective items
are considered a reflection, a manifestation of the construct. They can be seen as an effect of the construct.
Reflective constructs will generally produce higher scores on reliability measures but lower path coefficients
than formative constructs (Barclay et al., forthcoming)
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First generation multivariate methods, like multiple regression, factor analysis,
analysis of variance and others have become extremely useful tools for researchers.
First generation methods help evaluate constructs and relationships between
constructs. However, such an evaluation has to be performed in subsequent steps.
Other methods, called second generation methods (Fornell 1984) perform analysis of
a model as a whole instead of simply evaluating each relationship separately. Instead
of simply aggregating measurement error in a residual error term, these methods
simultaneously evaluate both the measurement model and the theoretical model. They
adjust the relationships among the variables accordingly (Rivard et al. 1994). Two
of these newer methods, and probably the most popular ones, are covariance structure
analysis (most often referred to as LISREL) and partial least squares (PLS).
PLS was selected in this study, and the procedure adopted to evaluate the
measurement properties of the instruments was similar to the procedure described by
Barclay, Higgins, and Thompson (forthcoming) and Rivard et al. (1994). In this
study, PLS was preferred to LISREL for the analysis for several reasons, mainly
related to data distribution and to the role of each method in the theory development
: theory testing continuum. Examination of the data showed that the distribution did
not meet the multi-normality criterion required by LISREL. PLS presupposes no
distributional form on the data. Furthermore, some of the measures were used for the
first time. PLS is considered appropriate for early stages of research, when theory is
untested in an application domain (Gopal, Bostrom, and Chin 1992). Therefore, a
method close to the data, such as PLS, as opposed to one close to the theory, such as
LISREL, was preferred.
The purpose of this validation was to further refine the measuring instrument. To do
this, a subset of the questionnaires was randomly selected from the sample of
completed questionnaires to perform the analysis. The remaining of the questionnaires
would latter be used to test the model. The rule of thumb that prevails for the smallest
sample size required to perform PLS analysis is that the sample size must be ten times
the number of items present in the largest construct. Some authors even argued that
five times the number of items in the largest construct may be sufficient (Gopal et al.
1992). In this study, the largest construct was task complexity, including 20 items .2
Consequently, a sample of at least 200 questionnaires (100 for the less stringent
requirement of five to one) was required. To perform the PLS analysis, a sub-sample
of 250 questionnaires was randomly selected. This then exceeded the minimal norm
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regarding sample size and accordingly assured a meaningful appraisal of the quality
of each measure. In the following sections the evaluation process is described.
5.1 Reliability Assessment
Four criteria were used in reliability assessment. The first is Cronbachs alpha. The
second is individual item reliability as evaluated with PLS. As described in Barclay
et al. (forthcoming) and Rivard et al., (1994) it is recommended to determine, using
PLS, the loading of each item with its construct. These loadings should be higher than
0.5, following the criterion suggested by Rivard and Huff (1988) to indicate that
significant variance is shared between each item and the construct. As mentionned by
Kerlinger (1986) for the analogous factor analysis approach, there is no generally
accepted standard error of factor loading. The 0.5 level is considered conservative by
many researchers (Barki and Hartwick, 1994; Straub, 1989). The third indicator of
the reliability of the measure is the Rho coefficient, provided by PLS. It is the sum of
the explained construct variance divided by the total variance (explained construct
variance plus error variance). This coefficient is analogous to Cronbachs alpha
except that it is weighted by the loadings of the different items on the variable. The
guidelines established by Nunnally (1978) for the interpretation of Cronbachs alpha
also apply to the Rho coefficient (Rivard et al., 1994). Finally, the value of average
variance extracted was examined. The measures should represent a high proportion
of the construct variance. The average variance extracted should be higher than 50%
(Rivard et al., 1994). These criteria should enable a critical evaluation of the
measures and the identification of the items that should be removed from the
instruments.
Table 1 presents the results of the PLS analysis. The first column indicates the
variables being assessed. The rest of the table is divided into two. The first half
presents the scores obtained with the initial instruments, comprised of all the items.
The second half presents the results of the same tests on the instruments in which the
items that did not meet these criteria were eliminated. Of the nineteen original
variables, eight remained unchanged, ten had some items dropped and one was split
in two. In this last case, the analysis showed that the items forming the human
resources replacement delay variable were not a homogeneous group. The loading
pattern revealed that these items formed two distinct groups: the hiring and the training
delays. Subsequent PLS analysis showed that these two groups, when split, showed
significant reliability. The clan mechanisms variable had several items removed. The
mechanisms evaluated by several of these items were almost never used, by any of the
surveyed companies, and therefore did not load on the variable.
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5.2 Face Validity Assessment
Face validity is the extent to which an instrument looks appropriate. It is the
perception of knowledgeable individuals regarding the quality of the measure (Zmud
and Boynton, 1991). Our questionnaires were extensively reviewed, both by
practitioners and by academics. They were evaluated in terms of appropriateness of
the questions, the ability of the managers to answer them, the layout, and the apparent
completeness of the instrument. From these evaluations, corrections and
improvements were suggested and included in the instrument. These comments were
discussed in the practitioners validation and sorting exercise section.
5.3 Content Validity Assessment
Content validity is the extent to which the set of items comprised in a measure covers
a given domain. It is the sampling adequacy of the items which form the instrument.
This form of validity was ensured by a thorough literature review and by the
examination of outsourcing arrangements described by Aubert, Rivard, and Patry
(1993).
16
Table 1 Reliability Evaluation
Initial Instrument Final Instrument
# of
items
alpha rho AVE # of
items
alpha rho AVE
Governance Mechanisms
Governance Mode 11 .87 .90 .47 9 .89 .91 .54
Clan Mechanisms 8 .49 .68 .25 3 .64 .81 .57
Asset Specificity
Clients Investment 3 .52 .77 .53 3 .52 .77 .53
Human Resources Specificity 7 .72 .80 .37 4 .74 .82 .53
HR Replacement Delay 10 .73 .69 .27
HR Hiring Delay 5 .93 .98 .90
HR Training Delay 5 .76 .88 .60
Structural Liaison Devices 6 .64 .85 .50 5 .80 .87 .57
Suppliers Investments 9 .72 .80 .36 6 .63 .89 .52
Uniqueness 11 .89 .92 .52 11 .89 .92 .52
Measurement Problem
Formal Measures (in-house) 8 .85 .89 .50 8 .85 .89 .50
Formal Measures (outsourced) 8 .84 .87 .46 6 .82 .87 .53
Formalization 7 .76 .87 .52 7 .76 .87 .52
Standardization (in-house) 6 .81 .89 .60 6 .81 .89 .60
Standardization (outsourced) 6 .79 .86 .51 6 .79 .86 .51
Task Complexity (in-house) 20 .84 .88 .28 9 .83 .87 .43
Task Complexity(outsourced) 20 .86 .89 .31 9 .85 .88 .46
Task Difficulty (in-house) 2 .67 .86 .76 2 .67 .86 .76
Task Difficulty (outsourced) 2 .71 .87 .78 2 .71 .87 .78
Origin of Investment
Business Skills 11 .90 .92 .54 9 .91 .93 .64
Technical Skills 11 .82 .86 .37 7 .83 .88 .51
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5.4 Convergent and Discriminant Validity Assessment
Discriminant validity is the extent to which a measure of a construct differs from
measures of neighbouring constructs. It is the evaluation of the non-contamination of
a measure. PLS was used to evaluate the unidimensionality of the higher level
constructs (asset specificity, measurement problems, origin of the most important
investment, and the governance mechanisms). From the reliability analysis we
established a list of items composing each variable. Taking the 250 questionnaires,
the items were averaged to compute a score for each of the variables. These scores
were analyzed by PLS to verify the factor structure behind the various constructs. The
variables that pertain to the same constructs were indicated to PLS. The loadings of
all the variables within a same construct should be high on this construct, indicating
high convergent validity, and low on the other ones, indicating high discriminant
validity. The first characteristic shows that they share a great deal of variance with
their construct, and the latter that they are independent from the other constructs.
Several runs of PLS were conducted. When all the variables were put in the analysis
to produce the covariance matrix, too many missing values were present and, because
of the way covariances were computed, the resulting matrix represented too small a
sub-sample of the 250 questionnaires (any item missing would delete the whole case).
The variables formal measures, clan mechanisms, and investments (clients and
suppliers) had missing items and lowered the N for the correlations. Some missing
values were introduced by questions omitted by some respondents but most of them
were due to questions for which respondents did not have to answer, simply because
not all respondents had both outsourced and in-house activities. Therefore, the first
analysis was performed without these three variables, using all the other variables.
Table 2 presents the loading structure matrix obtained with the analysis. The variables
formal measures, clan mechanisms, and investments were subsequently included in
the analysis.
Most of the loading structure presented in Table 2 appeared to be correct. The
numbers in the columns represent the loadings of each variable on the constructs
indicated at the top of the column. The underlined numbers are the loadings of the
variables on their respective constructs. Therefore, we would expect the underlined
loadings to be high, displaying convergent validity (high loading of the variables on
their appropriate construct), and the other ones to be low, displaying discriminant
validity (low loading of the constructs to which they are not related ).
These results show that asset specificity had an imperfect loading structure.
Uniqueness did not load on any construct and structural liaison devices loaded on both
asset specificity and measurement problems constructs. All the other variables loaded
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adequately on their respective construct, demonstrating convergent validity, and did
not load significantly on any other one, demonstrating discriminant validity. To
improve the validity of the constructs, the uniqueness variable was isolated it in
another PLS run. The resulting matrix is presented in Table 3.
From the results presented, it seemed that the uniqueness of the activities should be
viewed separately, as a variable distinct from the other constructs. It loaded on a
single factor; no other variable seem to move jointly with it.
The other puzzling variable in our loading pattern was the structural liaison devices.
The rationale behind its inclusion in the specificity construct was that the more these
devices are put in place, the more closely linked the IS activities are to the firm and,
therefore, the more specific they are. Alternatively, these mechanisms could be an
attempt to increase the visibility of these activities. When activities are difficult to
evaluate, managing them through committees and joint structures help to make the
efforts performed by all parties more visible. These mechanisms can be seen as
facilitating structures for the management of difficult to measure activities. This could
be an explanation of the double loading of this variable on the two constructs.
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Table 2 PLS Loadings: Convergent and Discriminant Validity
Loadings
Governance
Mode
Asset
Specificity
Measurement
Problems
Origin of
the Most
Important
InvestmentVariables
Governance mode
Human res. specificity
Hiring delay
Training delay
Structural liaison devices
Uniqueness of activities
Formalization
Job standardization
Task complexity
Task difficultly
Business skills
Technical skills
1.00
0.11
0.06
0.17
0.14
0.08
0.03
-0.03
-0.01
0.06
-0.02
-0.29
0.19
0.49
0.69
0.73
0.30
-0.11
0.22
0.22
-0.09
0.10
0.06
-0.01
0.02
0.06
0.13
0.10
0.39
-0.02
0.60
0.85
0.50
0.70
0.15
-0.08
-0.21
-0.06
0.00
0.03
-0.06
-0.14
0.05
0.02
0.00
0.06
0.74
0.74
Table 3 PLS Loadings: Convergent and Discriminant
Validity After Correction
Loadings
Governance
Mode
Asset
Specificity
Uniqueness Measurement
Problems
Origin of the
Most
Important
InvestmentVariables
Governance mode
Human res. specificity
Hiring delay
Training delay
Structural liaison devices
Uniqueness of activities
Formalization
Standardization
Task complexity
Task difficultly
Business skills
Technical skills
1.00
0.11
0.06
0.17
0.14
0.08
0.03
-0.03
-0.01
0.06
-0.02
-0.29
0.20
0.48
0.68
0.73
0.33
-0.03
0.23
0.22
-0.08
0.10
0.06
-0.03
0.08
-0.04
-0.05
-0.02
0.10
1.00
0.00
-0.01
0.10
-0.11
0.03
-0.24
0.02
0.06
0.13
0.10
0.39
-0.02
0.60
0.85
0.50
0.70
0.15
-0.08
-0.21
-0.06
0.00
0.03
-0.06
-0.14
0.05
0.02
0.00
0.06
0.74
0.74
The final instrument may be obtained from the authors.3
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As mentionned, three additional PLS runs were performed with the formal measures,
the clan mechanisms, and the investment variables. The runs were conducted adding
each of these variables, one at the time in order to limit the missing value effect, to the
other ones presented in the previous analysis.
The loading of the formal measures variable on its respective construct was not very
high (0.37) but was much higher than the loadings on the other constructs, indicating
that is was in its proper construct. Thus, the discriminant validity of the formal
measures variable seemed sound but its convergent validity remained subject to
caution. Similarly, the clan mechanisms variable did not load on any other construct
than its own, indicating that it did not share much variance with the other high level
constructs. The loadings indicated an appropriate level of discriminant validity.
Finally, analysis of the variables related to the investments (client and supplier) was
performed. The results showed that both variables had a high loading on their
construct, asset specificity, and low loadings on the other constructs. This indicated
appropriate degrees of convergent and discriminant validity.
To evaluate discriminant validity, Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggest a comparison
between the average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor and the variance shared
between the constructs. The AVE is the variance shared between a construct and its
measures. The variance shared between the different constructs is the squared
correlations between the constructs. To complete this evaluation, we used the
correlation matrix of the constructs in which we replaced the diagonal with the square
root of the AVE (underlined in Table 4). Consequently, the elements on the diagonal
(underlined) should be notably higher than the elements off the diagonal.
The matrix showed such acceptable properties. The numbers on the diagonal are all
much larger than the elements off-diagonal. The largest correlation between two
different constructs (off-diagonal) is equal to 0.26 and the lowest AVE squared root
(on-diagonal) is 0.61. Therefore, the smallest on-diagonal element is more than twice
the largest off-diagonal element, confirming that the matrix corresponds to the
expected pattern. Furthermore, twelve of the fifteen correlation coefficients between
different constructs (off-diagonal) are under 0.20.
From this analysis, discriminant and convergent validity of the measures appeared to
be satisfactory. These multiple evaluations of discriminant and convergent validity
increased our confidence in the quality of the measures. The results suggested the fact
that different constructs are assessed with each measure.3
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Table 4 Variance Shared Between Constructs
Governance mode .73
Clan mechanisms .23 .75
Specificity .12 .13 .61
Uniqueness .08 -.05 .02 .72
Measurement problems .02 .24 .26 -.01 .63
Skills -.18 .06 .00 -.11 .08 .74
6. Conclusion
This paper proposes measures to assess the dimensions of IS operation transactions.
While more work remains to be done to improve those measures, the results obtained
are encouraging. The business and the technical skills required to perform an activity
were assessed for IS operations and these measures showed appropriate levels of
reliability. Asset specificity, much discussed in organizational economics, was also
evaluated. This first attempt to formally measure IS asset specificity lead to acceptable
results. In order to evaluate measurement problems, the study used new measures
tailored for IS operations. These measures correspond directly to the object of study
and can be used both by researchers trying to evaluate IS operations in various
contexts and by practitioners evaluating the management of their IS operations.
Measures from other studies were also used (Barki, Rivard, and Talbot, 1991; Miller
and Dröge, 1986; Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980). These measures had been previously
tested with first generation statistical methods, such as factor analysis. The use of
PLS, a second generation method, enabled further refinement and validation of these
measures. Confidence in these instruments has been increased.
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Appendix 1
1. Description of the Information Systems Operations
Please consider the following list of IS operations.  Please indicate, for each one, if your
firm is currently executing the operation in-house, using the internal Information
Systems Department, or if your firm is relying on a supplier (outsourcing).  If you are
relying on a supplier for an operation, please indicate the duration of the contract
between you and your supplier.  If one of the items listed below is not an operation of
your firm, please check the N/A (Not Applicable) box for this particular operation.
Operated Operated Operated on Totally N/A Information
in-house in-house by firm’s own outsourced unknown
by firm’s external equipment to an 
employees supplier’s on supplier’s external
employees premises supplier
a) Scheduling of operations ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(applications)
b) Control of operations ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(applications)
c) Production Support Services ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
d) CPU Operation ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
e) Operation of operating system ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
f) Operation of applications ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
g) Operating system maintenance ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
h) Disk space management ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
i) Hardware maintenance ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
j) Printer operation ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
k) Printer maintenance ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
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Appendix 2
6. Contract Management
a) Please check all the formal measures used in your contract (between your firm and your
supplier) in order to manage the information systems operations outsourced to this supplier.
~  MIPS used
~  MIPS available
~  Disk space used
~  Disk space available
~  Response time
~  Reliability (period without failure)
~  Accessibility (time-span of potential utilization)
~  Assessment of Client-Supplier relationship quality
~  Other: 
